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Demographic change has differential impacts on the welfare of current and future generations. In 
a simple closed economy, aging – a relative scarcity of young workers – increases wages, 
increasing the welfare of the young. At the same time, population aging will reduce rates of 
return to capital, thereby reducing the welfare of asset holders who are usually older than the 
population average. 
In a global world with pension systems, however, these effects are less straightforward, since 
international capital flows dampen the factor price changes. Moreover, pay-as-you-go pension 
systems financed by payroll taxes create a wedge between net and gross wages, and their 
intergenerational redistribution has important additional effects on the welfare of generations.  
To quantify these effects, we develop a large-scale multi-country overlapping generations model 
with uninsurable labor productivity and mortality risk. Due to the predicted relative abundance of 
the factor capital, the rate of return falls between 2005 and 2050 by roughly 90 basis points. Our 
simulations indicate that capital flows from rapidly ageing regions to the rest of the world will 
initially be substantial, but that trends are reversed when households de-cumulate savings. In 
terms of welfare, our model suggests that young individuals with little assets and currently low 
labor productivity indeed gain from higher wages associated with population aging. Older, asset-
rich households tend to loose because of the predicted decline in real returns to capital. 
JEL Classification: E17, E25, D33, C68 
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1. Introduction 
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, over time reducing the fraction of the 
population in working age. This process is driven by falling mortality rates followed by a decline 
in birth rates. This reduces population growth rates; in some countries, population will even 
decline. While demographic change occurs in all countries in the world, extent and timing differ 
substantially. Europe and some Asian countries have almost passed the closing stages of the 
demographic transition process while Latin America and Africa are only at the beginning (Bloom 
and Williamson, 1998; United Nations, 2002). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Population Growth Rate in 4 Regions 
Figure 1, based on UN population projections (United Nations, 2002), illustrates the differential 
impact of demographic change on population growth rates for the period 2000-2080. They are 
defined as the growth rate of the adult population, aggregated into four mutually exclusive 
regions of the world: the U.S., the European Union (EU), the rest of the OECD (ROECD) and the 
rest of the world (ROW).  
Population growth rates are predicted to decline in all regions, but to remain positive in the U.S. 
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and in the ROW region throughout the 21st century. In contrast, they will become negative in the 
EU by about 2016 and in the ROECD by about 2042, such that their populations start shrinking, 
while the populations of the other two world regions continue to grow. 
These striking differences in demographic change will change the global balance; induce 
differential factor price changes and international flows of labor, capital and products. All this 
will affect the welfare of the people living in these regions. This is the topic of this paper. As we 
will see, welfare is affected differentially not only across regions but also across generations. 
Figure 2 shows the impact of demographic change on working-age population ratios - the ratio of 
the working-age population (of age 20-64) to the total adult population (of age 20-95). This 
indicator, which will turn out to be crucial in our analysis, illustrates that the EU is the oldest, 
whereas the ROW is the youngest region in terms of the relative size of the working-age 
population. The United States and the rest of the OECD region initially have the same level of 
working-age population ratios, but the dynamics of demographic change differ substantially in 
the U.S. relative to the other regions. While working-age population ratios decrease across all 
regions, the speed of this decrease significantly slows down for the U.S. in about 2030. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of Working Age to Population Ratios in 4 Regions 
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The paper continues a line of research by Börsch-Supan (1996), Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and 
Winter (2002), Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2006) and, especially, Krüger and Ludwig 
(2006) that aim to quantify the effects of demographic change on macroeconomic developments 
and welfare. What are the effects of these long-run developments on relative factor prices and 
welfare? What are the additional effects of ongoing pension reforms that convert the pay-as-you-
go (PAYGO) pension systems into multi-pillar systems with potentially large capital stocks? 
The basic effects are intuitive: First, the changes in the population structure will alter aggregate 
labor supply and aggregate savings. This will change factor prices for labor and capital. Since 
labor will become scarcer, relative to capital, real wages will increase and real rates of return to 
capital will decrease. Second, if countries reform their PAYG pension systems, the additional 
supply of capital increases the downward pressure on the rates of return. This will have 
differential effects on the welfare of generations. The young may gain through higher wages, 
while the old may loose due to lower capital returns.  
While these basic mechanisms are intuitive, their quantification is difficult, especially in an 
international context. Quantification, however, is important in order to understand the 
implications for social security reform. If capital returns decline very little, welfare implications 
will also be small. If returns decline catastrophically, like suggested by some proponents of the so 
called “asset meltdown” hypothesis, pension reforms, that substitute parts of the PAYGO social 
security system by prefunded accounts, may create large welfare losses for future pensioners. 
This paper feeds the demographic projections by the United Nations into a computable 
overlapping generations’ model of the type pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). We 
extend the model to a multi-country version as in Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2006) and 
enrich the model by uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty, as in Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and 
Joines (1995), Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1999), Conesa and Krueger (1999) and 
Krüger and Ludwig (2006) plus risk insured by the social security system as modeled by Nataraj 
and Shoven (2003). 
Both extensions are indispensable for the welfare questions we want to address. First, employing 
a multi-country view is essential as capital markets are global and populations age differentially; 
for instance, the countries which supply capital to the U.S. age faster than the U.S. In our model 
capital can freely flow between different regions in the OECD (the U.S., the EU and the rest of 
the OECD). These capital flows may mitigate the decline in rates of return and the increase in 
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real wages from the perspective of fast aging economies such as the European countries. 
Second, uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty will endogenously give rise to some individuals 
deriving most of their income from returns to capital, while the income of others is mainly 
composed of labor income. Abstracting from this heterogeneity does not allow a meaningful 
analysis of the distributional consequences of aging-induced changes in factor prices. This model 
feature also adds a precautionary savings motive to the standard life-cycle savings motive of 
households, which makes life cycle savings profiles generated by the model more realistic. 
We find that the rate of return to capital decreases by roughly  80 to 90 basis points if capital is 
allowed to freely flow across regions. Our simulations indicate that capital flows from rapidly 
ageing regions to the rest of the world will initially be substantial, but that trends are reversed 
when households decumulate savings. However, due to the high correlation of long-run 
demographic developments among OECD countries in terms of trends in the working age 
population ratio, compare Figure 2, these capital flows do not affect much the long-run decrease 
of the rate of return. The latter does not change much whether we assume the U.S. (or Europe) to 
be closed or open economies. 
In order to evaluate the welfare consequences of the demographic transition we ask the following 
question: suppose a household economically born in 2005 would live through the economic 
transition with changing factor prices induced by the demographic change (but keeping its own 
survival probabilities constant at their 2005 values), how would its welfare have changed, relative 
to a situation without a demographic transition? We find that for young households with little 
assets the increase in wages dominates the decline in rates of return. Abstracting from social 
security and its reform, newborns in 2005 gain in the order of 0.6-0.9% in terms of lifetime 
consumption. Older, asset-rich individuals, on the other hand, tend to lose because of the decline 
in interest rates. If the demographic transition, in addition, makes a reform of the social security 
system necessary, then falling benefits or increasing taxes reduce the welfare gains for newborn 
individuals. An increase in the retirement age to 70, on the other hand, mitigates some of these 
negative consequences. 
Our paper borrows model elements from, and contributes to, three strands of the literature. 
Starting with Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) a vast number of papers has used large-scale OLG 
models to analyze the transition path of an economy induced by a policy reform. Examples 
include social security reform (see e.g. Conesa and Krueger, 1999) and fundamental tax reform 
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(see e.g. Altig, Auerback, Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser, 2001, Conesa and Krueger, 2005). 
A second strand of the literature (often using the general methodology of the first strand) has 
focused on the economic consequences of population aging in closed economies, often paying 
special attention to the adjustments required in the social security system due to demographic 
shifts. Important examples include Huang, İmrohoroğlu and Sargent (1997), De Nardi, 
İmrohoroğlu and Sargent (1999), and, with respect to asset prices, Abel (2003). 
The contributions discussed so far assume that the economy under investigation is closed to 
international capital flows. However, as the population ages at different pace in various regions 
of the world one would expect capital to flow across these regions. The third strand of the 
literature our paper touches upon therefore is the large body of work in international 
macroeconomics studying the direction, size, cause and consequences of international capital 
flows and current account dynamics, reviewed comprehensively in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
Our paper is most closely related to work that combines these three strands of the literature, by 
using the methodology of large scale OLG models to study the consequences of demographic 
change in open economies. The work by Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2006a, 2006b) construct 
a two region (the North and the South) OLG model to study the allocative and welfare 
consequences of different social security reforms in an open economy. Compared to their model, 
we include endogenous labor supply and idiosyncratic income shocks. 
Similar to our own work, Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoff (2005) investigate the impact of population 
aging on the viability of the social security system and its reform. Building on earlier work by 
Brooks (2003) who employs a simple four period OLG model, Henriksen (2002), Feroli (2003) 
and Domeij and Floden (2005) use large scale simulation models similar to Börsch-Supan, 
Ludwig and Winter (2006) to explain historical capital flow data with changes in demographics, 
rather than, as we do, to study the welfare and distributional implications of future changes in 
demographics. Relative to this literature, we see the contribution of our paper in evaluating the 
welfare consequences of the demographic transition per se and not just the alternative social 
security reform scenarios, as well as in the analysis of the distributional consequences of 
changing factor prices due to population aging. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple two-period OLG model to 
illustrate the relationship between demographic change, per capita consumption and welfare. 
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Section 3 contains the description of our large scale quantitative simulation model and section 4 
presents our main results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. A Simple Model 
Key for understanding the results in section 4 is to notice that per capita consumption and 
individual welfare are entirely different concepts in OLG economies. Per capita consumption and 
output are cross-sectional measures referring to all households currently alive whereas welfare is 
a cohort based measure. Relevant for utility over the life-cycle are wages, interest rates and how 
consumption and leisure are weighted at different ages. Due to discounting, utility from future 
consumption is lower than from current consumption, giving more weight to consumption and 
leisure at young ages. 
As societies are aging, labor becomes relatively scarce and capital relatively abundant which 
leads to increases of wages and decreases in rates of return. This implies that the consumption 
profile is tilted over the life-cycle such that the young consume relatively more than the old. In 
per capita consumption, allocations are weighted with cohort sizes. Hence, as a consequence of 
demographic change, the size of those who consume more – the young – decreases whereas the 
size of those who consume less – the old – increases. If this compositional effect is stronger than 
the direct effect of a decrease in size of the overall population, per capita consumption decreases.  
However, from a life-cycle perspective, consumption when being young is relatively higher and 
consumption when being old is relatively lower. If the higher consumption at young ages has a 
higher utility weight than the lower consumption at older ages, then individual welfare increases. 
This leads to a result which is counterintuitive at first sight: per capita consumption and welfare 
may move into different directions. Demographic change leads to a reduction of per capita 
consumption, yet, at the same time, it also leads to an increase of the newborns’ life-time welfare, 
at least in the absence of social security. 
We now illustrate these insights using a simplified version of the Diamond (1965) model. Krüger 
and Ludwig (2006) develop an open economy version of the model with social security in order 
to illustrate the various interactions between demographic change, social security and 
international capital flows. Here, we do not address all these issues and focus on a closed 
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economy without social security. We also abstract from technological progress.2 
2.1. Households 
There are Nt young households who live for two periods and have preferences over consumption  
o
t
y
t cc 1, +  representable by the utility function  
logcty   logct1o .
  
In the first period of their lives households work for a wage wt and in the second period they 
retire. Since we ignore social security the budget constraints read as  
ct
y  st  w t
ct1o  1  rt1 st
  
where rt+1 is the real interest rate between period t and t+1. 
2.2. Firms 
The production function is given by 
Yt  K tN t 1− ,
   
where Yt is output and Kt is the aggregate capital stock. 
The production technology is operated by a representative firm that behaves competitively in 
product and factor markets. Assuming that capital depreciates fully after its use in production, 
profit maximization of firms implies that  
                                                 
2Certainly our results on per capita consumption and welfare also hold in an open economy model where 
relative prices are driven by the impact of the countries' relative sizes, see Krüger and Ludwig (2006) for 
more details. 
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1  rt  k t−1
w t  1 − k t ,
 
where  
k t  K tN t
 
is the capital intensity. 
2.3. Aggregation 
Market clearing requires that  
K t1  N tst
 
from which we also have that  
k t1  st t1N
 
where Ntγ  is the gross growth rate of the young cohort between periods t-1 and t. It also measures 
the working age to population ratio (the higher is Ntγ , the higher is that ratio), which allows us to 
map the predictions of this model to the data plotted in figure 2.3 
                                                 
3The population at time t is given by Pt=Nt+Nt-1  and the working age to population ratio is given by  
N t
N t  N t−1 .
  
which we can rewrite as  
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Equilibrium in this model can be characterized analytically. To do so we first solve the household 
problem and then aggregate across households. 
Optimal savings of the young are given as  
st  1   w t .
 
Substituting out for wages from above gives 
t t
(1 )s k .
1
αβ −α= +β  
From the capital market clearing condition we now get that  
t 1 tN
t 1
(1 )k k .
(1 )
α
+
+
−α β= +β γ  
In the steady state we have that NNt γγ =  and kt+1 = kt = k* where k* is the steady state capital 
stock given by  
k   N
1
1−
 
where ( )β
βαφ +
−=
1
1  . 
                                                                                                                                                              
1
1  1 tN
  
Thus Ntγ is a measure both of the population growth rate as well as the working age to population ratio. 
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2.4. Analysis 
Steady state consumption when young and old can now be written as  
y
o 1 y
1c k
1
c k c .
α
α−
−α= +β
= βα
 
From the utility function we can then derive that  
[ ]
y o
N
u ln(c ) ln(c )
(1 ) (1 )
ln ,
1
= +β
α +β −β −α= Ψ − γ−α
 
where ψ is some constant term that is independent of the exogenous variable γN. 
It now immediately follows that utility decreases in γN (or increases in ln k) if and only if  
1   − 1 −   0
   1 − 1   .
 
Notice that this is just the same condition as requiring the economy to be dynamically efficient 
because the golden rule capital stock maximizing per capita consumption is given by  
1
1
**
Nk ,
−α⎛ ⎞α= ⎜ ⎟γ⎝ ⎠  
that is, if ( )β
βαα +
−>
1
1  then k** > k*. 
We therefore have the result that in a dynamically efficient economy, utility is increased as the 
population growth rate is reduced. But from this we cannot conclude that decreases of the 
population growth rate lead to increases in per capita consumption because a decrease of γN leads 
to an increase of k** and k*. 
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To clarify this we now derive analytic expressions for per capita output and consumption. Let P 
be total population. Notice that we can write steady state per capita output as  
N
N
Y k N k .
P P 1
α αγ= = + γ  
Using the equilibrium for the steady state capital intensity, we can rewrite this expression as  
1 1
N
N
N
Y .
P 1
α α−α −α− γ= φ γ + γ  
We therefore have that  
∂ YP
∂N  

1− N − 1− 1
1  N
1
1  N −

1 −  .
 
That is, per capita output increases in γN if and only if  
N
1 ,
2
α < + γ  
which becomes less strong as γN is smaller (that is in economies with a shrinking population). 
As for per capita consumption we have that  
( ) 1 1
y y o o
y o
y o N 1
0 N
N
1 N
N
C c N c N
P N N
c N ( k )
N ( 1)
11 ,
1 1
α α
−α −α
α−
−−
+= +
γ +βα= γ +
−α γ= +αβφ φ γ+β + γ
 
which, apart from the constant, has the same form as the equation for per capita output. 
Therefore, the same condition as before applies. 
We can summarize these findings as follows: Starting from an initial steady state, then if γN falls 
we have – in the new steady state that the economy converges to – that (i) welfare of newborns is 
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unambiguously higher if the economy is dynamically efficient, that is, if ( )β
βαα +
−>
1
1  and (ii) 
per capita output and consumption are lower than in the initial steady state if Nγα +< 2
1 . 
This intuition derived from our simple model illustrates that per capita consumption and welfare 
may move into different directions.  
3. The Quantitative Model 
The quantitative model we use to evaluate the consequences of demographic changes for 
international capital flows, returns to capital and wages, as well as the welfare consequences 
emanating from these changes is the same as in Krüger and Ludwig (2006). We focus on the 
industrialized world decomposed into three regions: the United States (U.S.), the European Union 
(EU) and the rest of the OECD (ROECD). 
We can think of our simulation model as an engine for the following thought experiment: We 
allow country-specific survival, fertility and migration rates to change over time, inducing a 
demographic transition. Induced by the transition of the population structure is a transition path 
of the economies of the model, both in terms of aggregate variables as well as cross-sectional 
distributions of wealth and welfare. Summary measures of these changes will provide us with 
answers as to how the changes in the demographic structure of the economy, by changing returns 
to capital and wages, impact the distribution of welfare. Eventually, given by the assumption of a 
stable demography in the very far future, the economies will reach a steady state which permits 
the computation of the transition paths. 
Specifically, we start computations in year 1950 assuming an artificial initial steady state. We 
then use data for a calibration period, 1950-2004, to determine several structural model 
parameters. We then compute the model equilibrium from 1950 to 2050, the transition path of 
interest, and further onwards until the new steady state is assumed in 2300, far into the future.4 
 
                                                 
4 The steady state year of 2300 is chosen far into the future in order to avoid any contamination of the transition path 
between 2005 and 2050. 
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3.1. Demographics 
The demographic evolution in our model is taken as exogenous.5 It is the main driving force of 
our model in addition to the design of the social security system, see section 3.4. Households start 
their economic life at age 20, retire at age 65 and live at most until age 95. Since we do not model 
childhood of a household explicitly, we denote its twentieth year of life by j = 0, its retirement 
age by jr = 45 and the terminal age of life by J = 75. Households face an idiosyncratic, time- and 
country-dependent (conditional) probability to survive from age j to age j + 1, which we denote 
by st,j,i. 
For each country i we have data or forecasts for populations of model age { }75,...,0∈j  in years 
1950,…,2300. From now on we denote year 1950 as our base year t = 0 and year 2300 as the 
final period T and the demographic data for periods { }Tt ,...,0∈  by Nt,j,i. For simplicity, we 
assume that all migration takes place at or before age j = 0 in the model (age 20 in the data), so 
that we can treat migrants and individuals born inside the country of interest symmetrically. 
3.2. Technology 
In each country the single consumption good is being produced according to a standard 
neoclassical production function  
Yt,i  ZiK t,i A tL t,i 1− ,
 
Where Yt,j is output in country i at date t, Kt,j and Lt,j are capital and labor inputs and At is total 
labor productivity, growing at a constant country independent rate g. The scaling parameters Zi 
control relative total factor productivities across countries, whereas the parameter α measures the 
capital share and is assumed to be constant over time and across countries. In each country capital 
used in production depreciates at a common rate δ. Since production takes place with a constant-
returns to scale production function and since we assume perfect competition, the number of 
firms is indeterminate in equilibrium and, without loss of generality, we assume that a single 
representative firm operates within each country. 
                                                 
5 While the UN demographic forecasts include a projection of future fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration 
flows, these projections are not modified by our model output. 
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3.3. Endowments and Preferences 
Households value consumption and leisure over the life cycle according to a standard time-
separable utility function  
E ∑
j0
J
 jucj , 1 − lj ,
 
where β is the raw time discount factor and expectations are taken over idiosyncratic mortality 
shocks and stochastic labor productivity. In particular, the expectations operator E encompasses 
the survival probabilities st,j,i. 
Households are heterogeneous with respect to age, a deterministic earnings potential and 
stochastic labor productivity. These sources of heterogeneity affect a household's labor 
productivity which is given by  
 k j.
 
First, households’ labor productivity differs according to their age: εj denotes average age-
specific productivity of cohort j. Second, each household belongs to a particular group 
{ }Kk ,...,1∈  that shares the same average productivity θk. Differences in groups stand in for 
differences in education or ability, characteristics that are fixed at entry into the labor market and 
affect a group's relative wage. We introduce these differences in order to generate part of the 
cross-sectional income and thus wealth dispersion that does not come from our last source of 
heterogeneity, idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Lastly, a household's labor productivity is 
affected by an idiosyncratic shock, { }E,...,1∈η , that follows a time-invariant Markov chain with 
transition probabilities  
 k j.
 
We denote by П the unique invariant distribution associated with π. 
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3.4. Government Policies 
Key government policy in, and the second exogenous driving force of, our model is pension 
policy. The main ingredient are country-specific pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) public pension 
systems whose taxes and benefits will adjust to the demographic changes in each country. On the 
revenue side, households pay a flat payroll tax rate, τt,i, on their labor earnings. Retired 
households receive benefits, bt,k,i, that are assumed to depend on the household type, θk , but are 
independent of the history of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Social security benefits are 
therefore given by  
bt,k,i   t,i k1 −  t,iw t,i ,
 
where ρt,i is the pension system's net replacement rate. 
We assume that the budget of the pension system is balanced at all times such that taxes and 
benefits are related by  
 t,iw t,iL t,i  ∑
k
b t,k,i ∑
j≥jr
N t,j,k,i ,
   
where Nt,j,k,i  denotes the population in country i at time t of age j and type k. 
In order to shed light on the interaction between the implications of demographic change and the 
type of social security system, we apply four different scenarios for the future evolution of the 
social security system: 
• Scenario 1 models a defined contribution PAYGO system in which taxes are held constant 
and replacement rates adjust according to the demographic change. 
• Scenario 2 models a defined benefit PAYGO system in which replacement rates are held 
constant and taxes adjust according to the demographic change. 
• A third scenario models an increase in the retirement age and, in addition, adjusts benefits, if 
needed, to assure budget balance. 
• Finally, as a benchmark, our fourth scenario has no PAYGO system altogether such that all 
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old-age provision is done via private savings modeled by the life-cycle saving and 
consumption decisions of the households. 
In addition to its role as governor of the social security system, the government also distributes 
accidental bequests left by those households who die before age J. It collects their assets and 
redistributes them in a lump-sum fashion among the remaining citizens of the country.  
3.5. Market Structure 
In each period there are spot markets for the consumption good, for labor and for capital services. 
While the labor market is a national market where labor demand and labor supply are equalized 
country by country, the markets for the consumption good and capital services are international 
where goods and capital flow freely, and without any transaction costs, between countries. The 
supply of capital for production stems from households in all countries who purchase these assets 
in order to save for retirement and to smooth idiosyncratic productivity shocks. As sensitivity 
analysis, we explore how countries would be affected by their demographic changes if they were 
closed economies where capital stocks and accumulated assets coincide by definition. 
3.6. Equilibrium 
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is defined by sequences of individual decision 
functions, sequences of production plans for firms, sequences of policies by the government, 
prices, transfers and cross-sectional measures such that (i) households and firms behave 
optimally, (ii) the government budget constraint holds, and (iii) aggregation conditions hold and 
(iv) markets clear. A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which all individual 
functions are constant over time and all aggregate variables grow at a constant rate. A formal 
definition of equilibrium is given in Krüger and Ludwig (2006). 
3.7. Calibration 
Calibration of the model is based on the minimum distance method developed in Ludwig (2005) 
extensively in Krüger and Ludwig (2006). Tables I and II summarize the information on the 
values of technology and preference parameters, respectively. Notice that some of these 
parameters are restricted to be identical across regions while others are allowed to differ. In 
particular, total factor productivities, Zi, are scaled such as to match labor productivities and 
consumption share parameters, ωi, are determined such as to match hours worked in the three 
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regions of our model. 
Table I: Technology Parameters 
Parameter U.S. EU ROECD 
Capital Share α 0. 33  
Growth Rate of Technology g 0. 018  
Depreciation Rate δ 0. 04  
Total Factor Productivity Zi 1. 0  0. 88  0. 65  
 
Table II: Preference Parameters 
Parameter U.S. EU ROECD 
Coefficient of RRA σ 1. 0  
Time Discount Factor β 0. 9378  
Consumption Share Parameter ωi    0. 463  0. 446  0. 442  
 
Data for calibrating the social security system are taken from various sources. For the U.S., we 
calculate social security contribution rates from NIPA data taken from the BEA Table 3.6. For 
the other world regions, we proxy the time path of social security contribution rates by using time 
path information on total labor costs taken from the BLS and scale these data by the social 
security contribution rates reported by the OECD. Using these contribution rates and the 
demographic data, we back out replacement rates by the PAYGO budget constraint. 
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3.8. Solution Method 
For given structural model parameters we solve for the equilibrium of the model in separate outer 
and inner loop iterations. Throughout we take as length of the period one year. Outer loop 
iterations search for equilibrium interest rates, contribution rates and accidental bequests using a 
modification of the familiar Gauss-Seidel algorithm (see Ludwig, 2006). Recursive methods are 
used to solve the household model in inner loop iterations which are described in detail in Krüger 
and Ludwig (2006).  
4. Results 
In order to isolate the direct effects of demographic changes on returns to capital, international 
capital flows, and the distribution of wealth and welfare we first abstract from social security in 
our analyses of sections 4.1 through 4.3. In section 4.4 we quantify the additional effects that are 
implied by the adjustments of social security parameters to demographic change. 
One element that distinguishes our model from the earlier work in Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and 
Winter (2006) is idiosyncratic risk. This enables us to characterize the distributional 
consequences of demographic change in a more realistic setting. In section 4.5 we address its 
implications for the general equilibrium rates of return and wages as well as for welfare. 
Throughout we assume that capital flows freely between regions in the OECD.  
4.1. Dynamics of Aggregate Statistics 
In figure 3 we display the evolution of the real return to capital from 2000 to 2080. In the same 
figure we plot, as a summary measure of the age structure of the population, the fraction of the 
world adult population with age above 65 (by assumption these individuals are retired in our 
model); this statistic is one minus the working age to population ratio. We observe that the rate of 
world-wide return to capital is predicted to fall by almost 1 percentage point in the next 60 years 
and then to settle down at that lower level.  
Pre-tax wages are related to the interest rate by 
w t,i  1 − ZiA t Zirt  

1−
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and thus de-trended (by productivity growth) real wages follow exactly the inverse path of 
interest rates, documented in figure irbench. These de-trended wages are predicted to increase by 
roughly 4% between 2000 and 2050 in all regions in our model. 
In figure 4 we plot the evolution of de-trended output per capita in the three regions, normalized 
to 1 in the year 2000. Notice that per capita here refers to the adult population aged 20 to 95. We 
observe substantial declines of 7 to 13% in the three regions. The decline is least pronounced in 
the U.S., since there the decrease of the fraction of households in working age is more modest 
after 2030, as we saw in figure 2. During the transition period from 2005-2050, the negative 
effects of decreasing working age to population ratios therefore dominate the positive effects on 
output per worker (see the discussion in section 2). 
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Figure 3: Evolution of World Interest Rates 
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Figure 4: Evolution of GDP per Capita in 3 Regions 
4.2. Quantifying International Capital Flows 
In order to analyze the direction and size of international capital flows we will document the 
evolution of the net foreign asset position and the current account of the countries/regions under 
consideration. The current account is given by the change in the net foreign asset position and 
thus by the difference of country i's saving and investment6  
.,,
,,1,
itit
ititit
IS
FFCA
−=
−= +  
When reporting these statistics we always divide them by output Yt,i. We start with investigating 
                                                 
6Note that in a closed economy Ft,i = Ct,i = 0 and that in a balanced growth path of an open economy  CAt,i 
= g (At,i – Kt,i) Furthermore, net asset positions and current accounts evidently have to sum to 0 across 
regions: 
∑
i
F t,i  ∑
i
CA t,i  0 for all t.
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national saving and investment rates and then discuss the implied current account and net foreign 
asset positions.  
The most direct effect of an aging population is that labor, as a factor of production, becomes 
scarce. As a result, for unchanged aggregate saving the return to capital has to fall and gross 
wages have to rise. This is what we observe in figure 3. However, the decline in interest rates 
may reduce the incentives of households to save, depending on the relative size of the income and 
substitution effect. In addition, with the aging of society the age composition of the population 
shifts towards older households, who are dis-savers in our life cycle model. Consequently savings 
rates in all regions in our model decline over time. For the next 20 years the fall in savings rates 
is most pronounced for the U.S., because there, during this time period, the large cohort of baby 
boomers moves into retirement. The same is true for other regions of the world, albeit to a lesser 
degree on average7. After the large cohort of baby boomers have left the economy (i.e. died) the 
U.S. saving rate is predicted to rebound (in about 25 to 35 years) and then to stabilize, whereas in 
the European Union and the rest of the OECD savings rates continue to fall until about 2040 and 
then stabilize. 
The other side of the medal (that is, of the current account) is the investment behavior in the 
different regions. Given that savings rates decline globally due to population aging investment 
rates have to do so as well on average, since the world current account has to balance to 0. As the 
population ages and the labor force declines it is optimal to reduce the capital stock with which 
these fewer workers work. Thus investment rates fall.This fall is by far the least pronounced for 
the U.S.. Furthermore, in the U.S., the investment rate stops to fall by about 2020, roughly a 
decade earlier than its saving rate. This is due to the fact that the fall in the working age to 
population ratio is completed around that date in the U.S.. On the other hand, in the EU and the 
rest of the OECD this ratio continues to fall until 2035. Since capital-(effective) labor ratios have 
to be equalized, capital allocated to these regions has to fall (relative to the U.S.) and so do 
                                                 
7Notice that the evolution of demographic variables and the simulated time paths of savings may differ 
substantially across the countries within each country block, see, e.g., Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter 
(2006). 
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investment rates in these regions. 
Figure 5 shows the current account to output ratios resulting from these dynamics of saving and 
investment rates. It depicts a clear deterioration of the U.S. current account of about 2% of GDP 
that is expected to occur in the next 30 years, as capital flows from the European Union and, with 
a slight time delay, from the rest of the OECD, into the U.S.. By 2040 this process is completed 
and the current account of all countries returns to roughly 0 from that point on. The predicted 
deterioration in the U.S. current account is due to an investment rate that falls less than in other 
countries (since the population in the US ages slower and thus the labor force falls less) as well as 
a (temporary) sharp decline in the U.S. savings rate in the next 20 years due to the gradual 
retirement of the baby boomers. 
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Year
C
A
/Y
current account / output ratio
 
 
US
European Union
Rest OECD
 
Figure 5: Evolution of the Current Account in 3 Regions 
4.3. Distributional and Welfare Consequences of 
Demographic Change 
In the previous sections we have documented substantial changes in factor prices induced by the 
aging of the population, amounting to a decline of about 1 percentage point in real returns to 
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capital and an increase in gross wages of about 4% in the next decades. In this section we want to 
quantify the distributional and welfare effects emanating from these changes. 
Evolution of Inequality 
In figure 6 we display the evolution of income inequality over time in the three regions. Income 
is composed of labor income (which later will include pension income) and capital income as 
well as transfers from accidental bequests. 
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Figure 6: Evolution of Income Inequality in 3 Regions 
We observe a significant increase in income inequality between 2000 and 2080, of about 5 points 
in the Gini coefficient for the EU and the ROECD and 3.5 points in the U.S.. The reason for this 
increase is mainly a compositional effect. Retired households have significantly lower income on 
average than households in working age. The demographic transition towards more retired 
households therefore is bound to increase inequality, especially in those regions where the 
increase in the fraction of retired households among the population is very pronounced. This 
explains the more modest increase in income inequality in the U.S.. Note that consumption 
inequality follows income inequality trends fairly closely in the three regions (and thus is not 
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shown here), but increases in consumption inequality are less pronounced. Also notice that the 
ordering of countries in the figure will be reversed once we add pension systems - then, income 
will be least equally distributed in the U.S.. 
The fact that it is not a rise in capital income inequality that drives the increase in total income 
inequality becomes clear when plotting wealth inequality over time (see Figure 7). There is no 
discernible increase in the same period; evidently the same is true for capital income inequality 
since capital income is proportional to wealth. 
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Figure 7: Evolution of Wealth Inequality in 3 Regions 
In contrast to income, wealth follows a hump-shaped pattern over the life cycle (on average), 
with the elderly and the young being wealth-poor. Thus, in contrast to income inequality, the 
aging of the population does not lead to an increase in wealth inequality, since the demographic 
change increases the fraction of the elderly, but reduces the fraction of the young. Consequently 
income and wealth inequality do not follow the same trend over time, nor is the ranking in 
inequality across regions the same for income and wealth. 
We therefore conclude that the opposite general equilibrium effects on wages and interest rates 
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have little impact on the income and wealth distribution across generations. 
Welfare Consequences of the Demographic Transition 
A household's welfare is affected by two consequences of demographic change. First, her lifetime 
utility changes because her own survival probabilities increase; this is in part what triggers the 
aging of the population. Second, due to the demographic transition she faces different factor 
prices and government transfers and taxes (from the social security system and from accidental 
bequests) than without changes in the demographic structure. Specifically, households face a path 
of declining interest rates and increasing wages, relative to the situation without a demographic 
transition. 
We want to isolate the welfare consequences of the second effect. For this we compare lifetime 
utility of individuals born and already alive in 2005 under two different scenarios. For both 
scenarios we fix a household's individual survival probabilities at their 2005 values; of course 
they fully retain their age-dependence. Then we solve each household's problem under two 
different assumptions about factor prices (and later taxes/transfers, once we have introduced 
social security). Let ( )akjitW ,,,,, η  denote the lifetime utility of an individual at time t ≥ 2005 in 
country I with individual characteristics (j,k,η,a) that faces the sequence of equilibrium prices as 
documented in the previous section, but constant 2005 survival probabilities, and let  
( )akjitW ,,,,,2005 η denote the lifetime utility of the same individual that faces prices and 
taxes/transfers that are held constant at their 2005 value. Finally, denote by g(t,i,j,k,η,a) the 
percentage increase in consumption that needs to be given to an individual (t,i,j,k,η,a) at each 
date and contingency in her remaining lifetime (keeping labor supply allocations fixed) at fixed 
prices to make her as well off as under the situation with changing prices.8 Positive numbers of 
g(t,i,j,k,η,a) thus indicate that households obtain welfare gains from the general equilibrium 
effects of the demographic changes, negative numbers mean welfare losses. Of particular interest 
                                                 
8For the Cobb-Douglas utility specification for σ ≠ 1 the number g(t,i,j,k,η,a) can easily be computed as 
.
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A similar expression holds for σ = 1. 
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are the numbers g(t = 56,i,j = 0,k,η,a = 0) that is, the welfare consequences for newborn 
individuals in 2005 (t = 56) (remember that newborns start their life with zero assets). 
Table III documents these numbers for type 1 for the U.S., differentiated by their productivity 
shock η. The results for type 2 are nearly identical.9 
 
Table III: Welfare Cons., US – Pure Demographic Effects 
Productivity η1 Productivity η2 
0. 9%  0. 6% 
 
We make several observations. First, newborn individuals experience welfare gains from 
changing factor prices and transfers induced by the demographic transition (compare the 
discussion in section 2). Apart from changing preferences through higher longevity (an effect we 
control for in our welfare calculations) the demographic transition substantially increases the real 
wage over time, reduces the interest rate and first increases and then (after 2040) somewhat 
reduces transfers from accidental bequests. The effect from changes in transfers is small, at least 
for newborns. The dominating effect for newborn individuals is the substantial increase in wages, 
partially because these individuals have not yet accumulated assets and thus do not suffer from a 
loss of capital income on already accumulated financial wealth, in contrast to older households. 
Of course, a lower interest rate makes it harder for these households to accumulate assets for 
retirement. Since borrowing is ruled out the decline in interest rates alone therefore has 
unambiguously negative consequences for welfare. 
Second, individuals born with low productivity will experience somewhat higher welfare gains 
                                                 
9The welfare consequences are very similar for other countries and type k2. In fact, in the benchmark 
model the only difference across countries and types stems from accidental bequests, which are 
redistributed in a lump-sum fashion and whose dynamics varies slightly across countries. Since these 
transfers are small in magnitude, however, so are the cross-country and cross-type differences in welfare. 
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than individuals that start their working life with high productivity. Low productivity individuals 
expect higher productivity in the future, and thus benefit more strongly from the increasing wage 
profile induced by the demographic transition than the currently highly productive, whose 
productivity is going to fall in expectation. 
Given that the welfare impact of changing factor prices constitutes a trade-off between increasing 
wages and falling returns to capital one would expect that those members of society for whom 
labor income constitutes a smaller part of (future) resources than capital income benefit less from 
the demographic transition. An advantage of our model with uninsurable idiosyncratic income 
shocks and thus endogenous intra-cohort wealth heterogeneity is that it allows us to document 
how the welfare consequences are distributed across the population, both across and within 
cohorts. Figure 8 plots the welfare gains for individuals of age 60 in 2005. These households  
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Figure 8: Welfare Change 
have most of their working life behind them, thus are fairly unaffected by the wage changes, and 
simply experience lower returns on their accumulated savings. We see that individuals in this 
cohort suffer welfare losses which increase substantially by the amount of financial assets they 
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have already accumulated. To give a sense of how many individuals there are at different points 
in the asset distribution, the support of this distribution for the 60 year old ranges roughly to a = 
12 (about 19 times GDP per capita), with median asset levels around 4 (10) times GDP per capita 
for the low η-low (high) type individuals and about 4.1 (10.8) times GDP per capita for the high 
η-low (high) type individuals. Overall, a fraction of 38 percent of individuals economically alive 
in 2005 gain from the changing factor prices. These tend to be young individuals with little assets 
and currently low labor productivity. 
4.4. The Role of Social Security 
So far, we have abstracted from government policies. An idealized pay as you go public pension 
system can respond to an increase in the share of pensioners in the population by (a combination 
of) at least three ways: cutting benefits, increasing social security contribution rates or increasing 
the retirement age. While a likely response will include all elements, we now present results for 
the model with a PAYGO social security system that responds to population aging by either 
holding tax rates fixed (and thus cutting benefits), by holding replacement rates fixed (and thus 
raising taxes), or by increasing the retirement age.10  
Because of the strong influence of a public pension system on private savings behavior, we 
expect that these different reform scenarios may have substantially different implications for the 
evolution of factor prices and the size and direction of international capital flows as well as the 
distribution of welfare. This conjecture turns out to be correct. Note that for all exercises we re-
calibrate production and preference parameters such that each economy (with the different social 
security systems) attains the same calibration targets for the 1950 to 2004 period. 
In table V we show how the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates and prices differs across the 
various scenarios for social security. Comparing the no-social security scenario to a world with 
social security in which payroll tax rates are held constant (and thus benefits decline), we observe 
that changes in factor prices are roughly the same between the two scenarios.11 One big 
                                                 
10In our experiment we increase the mandatory retirement age by 5 years in 2005, and keep contribution 
rates fixed. When needed, benefits are adjusted to retain budget balance of the social security system. 
11Remember that we recalibrate our model so that in all scenarios the pre-2005 equilibrium features the 
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difference, however, is the change in social security benefits required to cope with the 
demographic transition, which implies a decline in replacement rates by about 5 percentage 
points in the scenario with social security. Column 4 demonstrates that keeping pension benefits 
constant and adjusting taxes, on the other hand, has dramatic consequences for the evolution of 
interest rates  
 
Table IV. Evolution of Aggregates in US, 2005-2050 
Var. No Soc.Sec. τ  fixed ρ fixed Adj of jr 
r  -0.86% -0.82% -0.26% -0.79% 
w  4. 1% 3. 8%  1. 2%  3. 6%  
Τ 0%  0%  5. 9%  0%  
Ρ 0%  -7.0% 0%  -10.0% 
Y/N  -5.2% -5.2% -9.5% -3.8% 
C/N  -4.7% -4.7% -7.4% -2.6% 
 
and wages, relative to the benchmark scenario of fixing tax rates for social security. With fixed 
benefits the incentives to save for retirement are drastically reduced, relative to the benchmark. In 
addition, the substantial increase in tax rates of 6 percentage points and the corresponding 
reduction in after tax wages make it harder to save. Therefore, despite the decline in the fraction 
of households in working age (and diminished incentives to work because of higher payroll 
taxes) now the capital-labor ratio remains roughly unchanged, because of the large reduction of 
household savings. Consequently the increase in wages and decline in returns is much less 
pronounced in this scenario. Finally, the last column of table IV shows that an increase in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
same capital-output ratio. 
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retirement age by 5 years, while leaving the change in factor prices roughly the same as in the 
benchmark, implies a much smaller decline in benefits as with a retirement age of 65 (see column 
2).12 Because of the expansion in labor supply output per capita falls significantly less in this 
scenario than in all others. 
Given these substantial differences in changes of allocations it is not surprising that the welfare 
consequences differ across these two scenarios as well. Table V summarizes the welfare losses 
from the demographic transition for newborns in the U.S. in 2005.13 We find that, because of the 
decline in benefits or the increase in taxes, the welfare implications from the demographic change 
are less favorable in a world with social security than without. Especially the policy option of 
keeping benefits constant and letting tax rates increase implies large welfare losses from 
population aging for newborns, and even more so for future generations (not shown here). If, in 
contrast, the retirement age is increased to age 70, low-type households who enter the labor 
market unproductive are especially benefiting. These households expect productivity to be higher 
in the future, face increasing wages and can exploit these longer now as they can work until age 
70. It is therefore this group for which the increase in wages presents a good opportunity to inter-
temporally substitute labor supply; consequently the benefit of being able to work longer and thus 
the overall welfare gains from changing factor prices are largest for this group. For older 
individuals the welfare losses from the demographic transition are significantly smaller with an 
expansion of the retirement age, relative to simply holding contribution rates fixed and let 
benefits decline (results not shown). Older households are given the option to endogenously 
respond to lower benefit levels by expanding their labor supply for five more years. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
12A further increase in the retirement age has no substantial effect on labor supply since households are 
not very productive beyond age 70 and thus choose to voluntarily retire around that age. 
13Note that the numbers of table VI do permit a meaningful welfare comparison of different social security 
reform scenarios to deal with the demographic change. In order to achieve this comparability in our 
welfare computations (and in these only) we always use the same parameters for all scenarios, those 
calibrated for the no social security benchmark. 
The table does not, however, permit an assessment as to whether households are better off in a world with 
or without social security. 
 32 
Thus we conclude that the option of increasing the retirement age leads to less welfare losses 
(and even welfare gains for some groups) from population aging than adjusting taxes or benefits 
alone. 
Table V. Welfare Consequences, Newborns in U.S. Evolution of Aggregates in US, 2005-2050
 No Soc.Sec. τ  fixed ρ fixed Adj of jr 
Type η1 η2 η1 η2 η1 Η2 η1 η2 
K1 0.9% 0.6% 0.8% 0.2% -1.6% -1.8% 1.4% 0.6% 
K2 0.9% 0.6% 0.4% 0.0% -1.8% -1.9% 0.8% 0.3% 
 
4.5. The Role of Idiosyncratic Risk 
We now investigate the role of idiosyncratic risk and ask whether our quantitative predictions 
change when we ignore idiosyncratic risk as has been done in earlier analyses (e.g., Börsch-
Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 2006). In order to illustrate the interactions between relative price 
changes and the insurance role of the pension system we here take as a benchmark scenario a 
social security system with fixed contribution rates. We then recalibrate the model such as to 
meet the same calibration targets on the aggregate level. Since a precautionary savings motive is 
not at work in an economy without risk, we have to increase the discount factor by two 
percentage points to make households sufficiently impatient such as to meet the calibration target 
of the capital output ratio. Our results for macroeconomic aggregates are summarized in table VI. 
Relative price changes are stronger in the scenario with risk because hours worked decrease more 
strongly and therefore social security benefits are more strongly reduced. As a consequence of the 
interplay of both effects, the capital output ratio increases by more and therefore the relative price 
effects are slightly stronger than in the scenario without risk. 
Finally, Table VII compares the welfare consequences of demographic change across the two 
scenarios. In these welfare comparisons we isolate the role of idiosyncratic risk by holding 
preference parameters constant (as before in table V) and by evaluating the welfare consequences 
for the equilibrium prices that resulted from our pure τ fixed scenario. With the exception of low 
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type, low shock households, all households are better off in a world without risk. By the mean 
reverting pattern of our wage processes, uncertainty about future wage income represents a 
chance for low type, low shock households. 
 
Table VI. US Aggregates, 2005-80 – The Role of Risk 
Var. τ  fixed τ fixed – no risk 
r -0.82% -0.75% 
w 3.8% 3.5% 
τ 0% 0% 
ρ -7.0% -6.3% 
Y/N -5.2% -3.9% 
C/N -4.7% -3.0% 
 
 
Table VII: Welfare Consequences – The Role of Risk 
 τ fixed τ fixed - no risk 
Type η1 η2  
K1 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% 
K2 0.4% 0.0% 0.5% 
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5. Conclusions 
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, bringing with it a potentially large 
impact on the returns to the production factors capital and labor. This paper reports that the rate 
of return to capital can be expected to decrease by about  80 to 90 basis points until 2050 with a 
corresponding increase of wages if PAYG social security systems are reformed such that 
contribution rates are held constant. Under such a reform, the welfare consequences from 
population aging through increasing wages and declining rates of return are positive in the order 
of up to 1% in lifetime consumption for newborns in 2005. This number masks important 
distributional shifts: households that have already accumulated assets lose from the decline in 
rates of return. As an interesting policy effect, our paper also shows that increasing the mandatory 
retirement age by five years is shown to substantially mitigate these losses and to significantly 
increase welfare gains of newborns. 
The welfare gains for newborns are actually larger than what we compute since in addition these 
newborns are expected to live longer than the current generation. Similarly, the welfare losses for 
older asset holders are smaller, since they also have a longer life expectancy. Quantifying the 
utility gains from living longer is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Future research will be devoted to several valuable additions. One important channel of 
adjustment to a shrinking labor force that we have abstracted from is endogenous human capital 
accumulation. Higher returns to human capital in the form of higher wages may make it optimal 
for young (and possibly older) households to obtain a better education, increasing the supply of 
effective labor. This effect may counteract some of the increase in the capital-labor ratio and 
hence mitigate the impact of population aging on factor prices. Another addition will be to 
differentiate among asset types. For example, out of life-cycle investment motives one may 
expect a stronger decrease of the rate of return on risk free assets and thus an increase of the 
equity premium. These issues are left for future research. 
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